MATHIAS, Judge.
Edward Lee Jackson ("Jackson") was convicted in Vanderburgh Circuit Court of murder and attempted murder. Jackson appeals and presents two issues, which we restate as:
We affirm.
Jackson and Rosalie Clark Myers ("Rosalie") had an "off and on" relationship for "eight or nine" years. Tr. p. 74. Jackson and Rosalie cohabitated for parts of this time. Tr. p. 75. At some point in February 2011, Jackson was banned from Rosalie's room at the Esquire Inn ("the Inn"), where she resided. Rosalie saw Jackson a couple of times subsequent to Jackson's expulsion from the Inn; however, these meetings occurred "somewhere else." Tr. p. 108.
On the night of March 10, 2011, Jackson came to Rosalie's room at the Inn uninvited. Tr. p. 76. Specifically, Jackson "walked up behind [Rosalie] as [she] was unlocking her door and he came in behind [her]." Id. Kevin Malicoat ("Malicoat"), a friend of Rosalie's and fellow Inn resident, was with Rosalie when Jackson arrived. Tr. p. 77. Rosalie was "scared" by the way that "[Jackson] came up on [her]," but she did not ask Jackson to leave at that time. Id. Jackson spent most of the evening with Rosalie. Tr. p. 79. Malicoat "ran in and out" of the room "all night." Id. During this time, Jackson and Rosalie consumed alcohol, used methamphetamine, and engaged in sexual activity. Tr. pp. 79-80, 117-18, 121-123. The conversation between Jackson and Rosalie during this time was often confrontational and Rosalie exited the room on multiple occasions to "cool off." Tr. pp. 79-80, 131. On one occasion, Rosalie left with Malicoat to take him back to his room. Tr. p. 81.
Shortly after 5:00 a.m. on March 11, 2011, Rosalie returned to her room with David Scott Devine ("Devine"), another friend and Inn resident. Tr. pp. 81-82. When Rosalie questioned Jackson about a second purchase of methamphetamine, Jackson informed her that he had consumed the second purchase in its entirety. Tr. p. 83. An argument ensued and Rosalie informed Jackson "either you leave or I leave." Id.
Jackson then stood up and stabbed Rosalie multiple times. Id. Devine stood up to confront Jackson. Tr. p. 85. Jackson then "turned around and started stabbing [Devine] from behind." Id. Rosalie's neighbor "heard a man screaming ... [and] a bunch [of] struggling." Tr. p. 329. In addition, the neighbor heard Jackson state "I'll stab you to death mother f* *ker." Tr. p. 331. Jackson stabbed Devine twelve times. Ex. Vol. III., State's Ex. 15. p. 1. Rosalie called 911 while Jackson was stabbing Devine. Tr. p. 91; Ex.
The responding officer, Cara Messmer ("Officer Messmer"), arrived at the Inn shortly after 5:30 a.m. She found Rosalie on the bed clenching her chest and covered in blood and Devine dead on the floor next to the bed. Tr. pp. 21-22. Rosalie told Officer Messmer that Jackson was the assailant. Tr. p. 46. Officer Messmer also observed a "switchblade" knife present on the bed. Tr. pp. 48-49. Rosalie was transported to a nearby hospital where she received treatment for her injuries. Tr. p. 89.
Meanwhile, Jeff Kingery ("Officer Kingery"), another patrol officer, "canvassed the area" in search of Jackson. Officer Kingery was informed that Jackson was traveling on a bicycle. Tr. pp. 56-57. When Officer Kingery located Jackson, his t-shirt, arms, and hands were covered in blood. Tr. pp. 59, 64. Officer Kingery ordered Jackson to stop. Id. Jackson failed to comply with the order and Officer Kingery testified that Jackson "saw [Officer Kingery] ... tr[ied] to evade ... [cut] back across the street and ... through a corner of a yard. Tr. pp. 59-60. Officer Kingery disabled Jackson by "knock[ing] [Jackson] off his bicycle ... and took him into custody." Tr. p. 60.
Devine received stab wounds to his head, neck, chest, abdomen, arm, and shoulder. Ex. Vol. III., State's Ex. 15 p. 1. Specifically, Devine died from a "stab wound to [his] heart." Id. at 2. Devine also suffered multiple other stab wounds, some of which could have been independently fatal. Tr. pp. 226-29, 231.
Rosalie also suffered multiple stab wounds. Id. Specifically, she received a laceration to her liver, cuts to her interior chest wall, a partially collapsed lung, and a cut to her brachial artery. Some of her injuries were potentially fatal. Id. At the time of her admission to the hospital, she had alcohol, methamphetamine, and cocaine in her system. Tr. p. 244.
DNA analysis was performed on samples taken from the knife and clothing of Rosalie, Devine, and Jackson. Tr. pp. 255-56, 270, 287, 307. DNA analysis of the knife handle indicated mixed profiles from which Jackson, Devine, nor Rosalie could be excluded.
On March 15, 2011, the State charged Jackson with the murder of Devine and the attempted murder of Rosalie. Appellant's App. p. 2. On April 7, 2011, the State alleged that Jackson was a habitual offender. Id. at 18. A jury trial was held in August 2011. At trial, Jackson claimed
A sentencing hearing was held on September 6, 2011. Sent. Tr. p. 1.
Jackson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting State's Exhibit 14(K), an autopsy photograph of Devine's heart, into evidence. Specifically, Jackson argues that the purpose of exhibit 14(K) was to "inflame the jury ... by showing them a gory photograph of an autopsy." Tr. pp. 213-14.
The admission and exclusion of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 627 (Ind.2002). We review the admission of photographic evidence for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind.1999); Amburgey v. State, 696 N.E.2d 44, 45 (Ind.1998)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before it. Payne v. State, 854 N.E.2d 7, 17 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).
Indiana Evidence Rules 401 through 403 govern relevancy of evidence. Relevant evidence is admissible; irrelevant evidence is not. Ind. Evidence Rule 402. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make any "fact that is of consequence to the determination" of the action more or less probable. Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Relevant evidence can be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Ind. Evidence Rule 403.
"Generally, photographs that depict a victim's injuries or demonstrate the testimony of a witness are admissible." Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946, 958 (Ind. 2009). "Even gory and revolting photographs may be admissible as long as they are relevant to some material issue or show scenes that a witness could describe orally." Amburgey, 696 N.E.2d at 45. However, manipulation of a corpse leads to concern that the work of a pathologist could be attributed to a defendant. Swingley v. State, 739 N.E.2d 132, 133 (Ind.2000). Therefore, autopsy photographs that depict the body in an altered
State's Exhibit 14(K) is an autopsy photograph of Devine's open chest. In the photo, Dr. Elmer Griggs, the pathologist who performed the autopsy, is using his right hand to grasp the decedent's heart and in his left hand is a metal probe with which he is indicating the stab wound to the heart. The trial court admitted the exhibit into evidence and found that the exhibit had "relevancy" and "significance" due to its depiction of the cause of death. Tr. p. 214. The trial court concluded that the exhibit's "probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect." Id.
Jackson relies heavily upon Swingley v. State to support his claim that the trial court erred in admitting the autopsy photograph. In Swingley, the victim died from exsanguination as a result of a cut in the neck. Swingley, 739 N.E.2d at 133-34. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of three autopsy photographs. Id. at 133. Two photographs showed open wounds to the victim's neck; the third depicted the victim's larynx, which had been removed from the body. Id.
In Swingley, our supreme court found that the first two autopsy photographs were admissible and that the
Id. at 134. Our supreme court found the third photograph, which showed the "victim's windpipe or larynx removed from the body and lying on a sheet" was "unnecessary" and that "other photographs depicted the extent of the victim's wounds and the cause of his death." Id.
Jackson asserts that State's Exhibit 14(K) is akin to the third, inadmissible picture in Swingley because "the State in this case presented another photograph of the wound depicted on Devine's heart in State's Exhibit 14(K)." Appellant's Br. at 14. We disagree. Rather, the two admissible photographs in Swingley are similar to State's Exhibit 14(K). The pathologist in Swingley testified that he "had opened the wound to show the blood vessels that had been cut (resulting in death)."
Tr. pp. 231-32.
Jackson asserts that State's Exhibit 14(E), an external photograph that depicts the chest wound corresponding to the laceration on Devine's heart, is "the same wound." Appellant's Br. at 15. However, State's Exhibit 14(E) merely shows a stab wound to the victim's chest. It is difficult to differentiate this exhibit from other photographs showing separate stab wounds to Devine's chest. State's Exhibit 14(K) was the only photograph specifically indicating the wound to the heart. Therefore, State's Exhibit 14(K) is not duplicative of other admitted evidence.
Jackson also argues that the autopsy photograph is similar to the improperly admitted photograph in Turben v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind.2000). In that case, a photograph of "gloved hands manipulating a bloody mass with a probe" that "barely resembles a human form" was improperly admitted by the trial court. Id. at 1247. The victim in Turben was strangled and the "bloody mass" purportedly showed "the victim's head with the skin and bones cut open and peeled back to expose the interior of the victim's neck." Id. In Turben, our supreme court "doubt[ed] the jury was further enlightened concerning the cause of death by viewing this gruesome spectacle" and because the gruesome photograph was only marginally relevant, its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value. Id.
In this case, State's Exhibit 14(K), coupled with the pathologist's testimony, was detailed, specific, and necessary to demonstrate the testimony given by the pathologist regarding the cause of death. Also, although graphic, State's Exhibit 14(K) clearly depicts both the victim's heart and the stab wound and clearly resembles a human form. The trial court was within its discretion in determining that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.
However, even if we were to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly admitting evidence, we will only reverse if "the error is inconsistent with substantial justice" or if "a substantial right of the party is affected." Payne, 854 N.E.2d at 17; see also Combs v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1252, 1258 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. If a conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt which satisfies the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction, the error is harmless. Morales v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1260, 1267 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). "Harmlessness is ultimately a question of likely impact of the evidence on the jury." Combs, 895 N.E.2d at 1258 (quotation omitted).
The trial court sentenced Jackson to sixty years for Count I (murder) and forty years for Count II (attempted murder).
Sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's sentencing decision is "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.2007) (quoting In re L.J.M., 473 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind.Ct. App.1985)). The trial court must enter a statement that includes the reasons for imposing a sentence. Id. at 491. If the statement indicates mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the court must identify those circumstances it finds significant and "explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating." Id. at 490.
A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) does not "enter a sentencing statement[,]" (2) enters "a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence — including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any — but the record does not support the reasons," (3) enters a statement that "omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration," or (4) considers reasons that "are improper as a matter of law." Id. at 490-91.
The trial court does not abuse its discretion by declining to find alleged
A guilty plea can be a significant mitigating factor when the State reaps a substantial benefit from the defendant's act of pleading guilty; this act conserves the State's resources and relieves the victim's family of the pain associated with trial. Cloum v. State, 779 N.E.2d 84, 89-90 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Jackson, while admitting to a legal status, did not accept responsibility for the crime. His guilty plea to his habitual offender status was subsequent to his murder trial; therefore, his guilty plea did not provide the same benefits to the State and victims as would a guilty plea to the underlying crime. In this case, Jackson's admission only relieved the State of its burden of proving the nature and chronology of Jackson's prior convictions, a burden that involves far fewer resources than a murder trial. In addition, the trial court specifically noted Jackson's willingness to admit his habitual offender status as a factor it would consider in sentencing. Sent. Tr. p. 15. Because the weight assigned to this factor is not reviewable for an abuse of discretion, see Gellenbeck v. State, 918 N.E.2d 706, 712 (Ind.App.2009) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491), appellate review of the weight assigned to this factor would invade the trial court's discretion, which we will not do.
The trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the probative value of State's Exhibit 14(K) outweighed its prejudicial effect. Moreover, any error in the admission of this exhibit was harmless. The trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion when considering Jackson's guilty plea to the habitual offender allegation.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and CRONE, J., concur.